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The Politics of Youth: 
Civil Rights Reform 
in the Waterloo Public Schools 
KATHRYN A. SCHUMAKER 
ON FRIDAY NIGHT, September 13, 1968, the East High School 
Trojans of Waterloo, Iowa, opened their football season against 
the St. Joseph Chargers of Westchester, Illinois. The game was 
played at Sloane Wallace Stadium at West High School in Wa-
terloo, an all-white school on the predominately white side of 
town. East High, which all of the city’s black high school stu-
dents attended, had no stadium to house its top–ranked team.1  
 During the halftime lull, police officers attempted to arrest a 
young African American man outside the stadium. When the 
young man resisted arrest, students in the stands took notice 
and poured outside the gates. Black students scuffled with po-
lice for the remainder of the game. Groups of students argued 
with police, who tried to control them with mace and clubs.2  
 After the game’s end, more chaos erupted across the Cedar 
River on the east side of town, where almost all of the city’s Af-
 
Members of the University of Chicago Social History Workshop and partic-
ipants in the University of Michigan Graduate Student Conference on the 
Long Twentieth Century read and provided many insightful comments on 
early versions of this article. I am especially grateful to Mark Bradley, Matt 
Briones, Jane Dailey, Chris Dingwall, Adam Green, Matt Lassiter, Amy Lip-
pert, Sarah Miller-Davenport, Emily Remus, Emily Romeo, Jim Sparrow, 
Katie Turk, and Sarah Weicksel. 
1. Waterloo Courier, 11/15/1967. 
2. Des Moines Register, 9/14/1968. 
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rican Americans lived. Someone started a fire at a lumber com-
pany that quickly engulfed its mill and three nearby homes. At 
East High, another person poured gasoline and then threw a 
match through a classroom window. For hours, police officers 
skirmished with groups of young men. When the violence finally 
ended around midnight, seven police officers were wounded 
and thirteen young people had been arrested. The next day, the 
streets were deserted except for hundreds of National Guards-
men who patrolled the city’s east side on foot with bayonets 
and in Jeeps and trucks stocked with smoke bombs.3  
 Civil disorder was not new to Waterloo; the summer before, 
another confrontation between a police officer and African 
American youths had sparked disorder that lasted several days. 
At the time, the editor of the Waterloo Courier commented to the 
New York Times, “We get calls from other newspapers and they 
all ask, ‘What are they doing rioting out there in the cornfields?’”4 
Young people in Waterloo were not, in fact, rioting in any corn-
fields, but the editor’s statement indicates how “urban” prob-
lems were considered to afflict only big cities in far-off states. 
Yet in the late 1960s, even in places that looked very much like 
Waterloo, young people expressed their grievances and frustra-
tions through instances of civil disorder.  
 
CIVIL DISORDER and the threat of disorder were common 
during the late 1960s. The Kerner Commission noted that in 
1967 there were nearly 70 instances of civil disorder in cities 
with populations of less than 100,000.5 Although the scale and 
length of the Waterloo disorder of 1968 did not come close to 
rivaling those in Newark or Detroit during the summer of 1967, 
which lasted for days and ended with dozens of deaths, the 
same frustrations instigated disorder in those large cities. Wa-
terloo’s smaller scale allows for a close analysis of how the dis-
                                                 
3. Waterloo Courier, 9/15/1968; New York Times, 9/15/1968. 
4. Waterloo Courier, 7/13/1967; New York Times, 7/14/1967. 
5. According to the Kerner Commission, out of a total of 160 total instances of 
disorder in 1967, 37 occurred in cities with fewer than 50,000 inhabitants and 
30 occurred in cities that had between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory Com-
mission on Civil Disorders (New York, 1968). 
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ruptions of 1968 reverberated well into the next decade and 
illuminates the influence of youth politics on the city during 
those years.  
 Before 1968 Iowans had attempted to address the problems 
of racial discrimination and segregation in their state with a 
series of voluntary efforts. The civil disorder of 1968 spurred a 
coalition of residents, white and black, to coalesce around the 
need for further reform. What those reforms would entail re-
mained a point of constant contention among students, parents, 
school administrators, and other residents. Through the debates 
of the following years, dismantling racial discrimination in the 
schools was at the forefront of community concerns—and it was 
pushed there by student activism. 
 After the national civil rights victories of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act, implementation of the re-
forms those laws demanded remained an important and press-
ing problem. Scholars have neglected to analyze that process, 
focusing instead on a declension narrative of the post-1965 
United States in which the nation became attuned to the efforts 
of civil rights activists in the North only when civil disorder and 
the rise of Black Power jolted its cities. That literature marries 
the urban crisis with the history of civil rights, and identifies 
suburbanization as key in unmaking the New Deal coalition of 
the 1960s. According to that narrative, segregation in northern 
schools was most often a product of residential segregation, 
which was amplified by white flight to the suburbs. Robert Self’s 
American Babylon most forcefully frames the post–civil rights era 
within a metropolitan schematic with the indelible image of the 
“white noose” created by a mass white exodus from cities to 
suburbs.6 The black freedom struggle in the North, with its focus 
on access to jobs, the amelioration of poverty, and fair housing, 
was doomed by broader phenomena shaping the American 
landscape during the 1960s and 1970s, especially deindustriali-
zation and white flight to the suburbs. Those factors contributed 
to the political influence of a resurgent conservatism, which fur-
ther foreclosed possibilities for civil rights reforms during the 
                                                 
6. Robert O. Self, American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland 
(Princeton, NJ, 2003). 
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1970s.7 White opposition to busing, perhaps demonstrated most 
notably in Boston, turned desegregation into a hot-button politi-
cal issue at the expense of the children involved.8
 Although suburbanization and the urban crisis profoundly 
shaped American politics in the second half of the twentieth 
century, that paradigm places a backlash to the racial liberalism 
of the 1960s at its center and ignores the complicated process 
that Americans faced in dealing with the changes in daily life 
wrought by the civil rights movement. Such a reliance on the 
macro-history of the era leaves out subtler transformations oc-
curring in Americans’ everyday lives. I argue that the late 1960s 
and early 1970s were also shaped by the new expectations cre-
ated by the civil rights movement’s successes—particularly the 
vision of equal schooling held by young people, who conceived 
of antidiscriminatory measures that would dramatically change 
the way children were educated and treated in schools. Those 
young people were emboldened by the new moral legitimacy 
given to civil rights reforms, and they demanded to be heard.  
 This telling of the story of the late 1960s shows how civil dis-
order was not just a symptom of a full-blown urban crisis but 
was also part of a larger struggle in the schools for what black 
students saw as their rights to equity in education and freedom 
from discrimination. Importantly, students in Waterloo were 
far less interested in desegregation than they were in imple-
menting what they saw as a new standard of race relations be-
tween school administrators, teachers, and students. Inspired 
and empowered by the civil rights movement’s successes in the 
                                                 
7. On the links between the rise of the New Right and suburbanization, see 
Kevin Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism 
(Princeton, NJ, 2005); and Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Poli-
tics in the Sunbelt South (Princeton, NJ, 2006). Lassiter argues that a new “color-
blind” political coalition of whites opposed busing to achieve school desegre-
gation on the grounds that it infringed on their rights as homeowners in the 
suburbs. See also Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and 
the Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton, NJ, 2007); Rick Perelstein, Nixon-
land: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America (New York, 2008); and 
Laura Kalman, Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974–1980 (New York, 2010). 
8. Ronald Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class and Ethnicity in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Chapel Hill, NC, 1991). See also Gregory S. Jacobs, Getting Around 
Brown: Desegregation, Development, and the Columbus Public Schools (Columbus, 
OH, 1998). 
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mid-1960s, Waterloo students asserted their own conceptions of 
racial equality and educational equity and, in the process, won 
concessions from the local school district. At the same time, the 
school board turned to school desegregation as a practical way 
to prove its commitment to racial equality in the schools. Shrink-
ing enrollments turned school desegregation into a policy choice 
made when it became apparent that a realignment of school at-
tendance zones would be necessary. White opposition to busing 
arose in Waterloo as the school board voted for a comprehensive 
desegregation plan, but opponents were ultimately not able to 
halt the implementation of the school board’s plan.  
 
IN 1968 Waterloo was a deeply segregated city with roughly 
75,000 inhabitants and a growing African American population. 
Waterloo’s economic base was in farm equipment manufacturing 
and agricultural products processing. The major employers in 
the city during the 1960s were the Rath meatpacking plant and a 
large John Deere factory, which both employed unionized black 
and white workers. In 1970 a full third of the city’s workers 
were engaged in manufacturing jobs—far more than in any 
other single sector of the local economy. During the early to mid-
twentieth century, the plants drew African American migrants 
from the South, who appreciated the factories’ well-paying jobs 
and the promise of escape from the oppression of the Jim Crow 
South. By 1970, 9 percent of the city’s inhabitants were black, 
and Waterloo was home to the third-largest African American 
population in the state behind Des Moines and Davenport. Af-
rican Americans were concentrated in five of the city’s neigh-
borhoods, all of which were on the northeast side of the Cedar 
River.9  
 The civil rights struggle in Iowa dated back to the nineteenth 
century. In 1868, a century before the student protests at East 
High School, Iowans voted in favor of five amendments that 
erased references to race in its state constitution. The amend-
ments extended the franchise to African American men and 
lifted a ban on their service in the state militia. They also struck 
                                                 
9. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (USCCR), School Desegregation in Waterloo, 
Iowa (Washington, DC, 1977), 1–2. 
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African American workers were drawn to relatively well-paying jobs at 
the Rath meatpacking plant in Waterloo. Photo from Labor Collection, 
State Historical Society of Iowa, Iowa City. 
the word white from considerations of state census enumerations 
and legislative district apportionment.10 Historically, Iowa legis-
latures and courts were liberal in protecting the civil rights of the 
state’s inhabitants—if only in word and not in deed. Civil rights 
statutes had been a part of Iowa state law since the late nineteenth 
century, but they proved difficult to enforce. Segregation devel-
oped despite the state’s image as a pioneer of racial liberalism.11  
                                                 
10. Robert R. Dykstra, Bright Radical Star: Black Freedom and White Supremacy on 
the Hawkeye Frontier (Cambridge, MA, 1993), 224. 
11. According to George William McDaniel, “Trying Iowa’s Civil Rights Act in 
Davenport: The Case of Charles and Ann Toney,” Annals of Iowa 60 (2001), 235–
38, in Iowa “it was virtually impossible to get a white grand jury to return an 
indictment in a civil rights case.” On the persistence of racial discrimination in 
Iowa in the twentieth century, see George William McDaniel, “Catholic Action 
in Davenport: St. Ambrose College and the League for Social Justice,” Annals 
of Iowa 55 (1996), 239–72; Katrina M. Sanders, “The Burlington Self-Survey in 
Human Relations: Interracial Efforts for Constructive Community Change, 
1949–1951,” Annals of Iowa 60 (2001), 244–69; and Noah Lawrence, “ ‘Since it is 
my right, I would like to have it’: Edna Griffin and the Katz Drug Store Deseg-
regation Movement,” Annals of Iowa 67 (2008), 298–30. On the development of 
liberal civil rights laws in Iowa during the nineteenth century, see Dykstra, 
Bright Radical Star; and Leslie Schwalm, Emancipation’s Diaspora: Race and Recon-
struction in the Upper Midwest (Chapel Hill, NC, 2009), 198–200. 
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 After years of sometimes violent white resistance to the 
public education of African American children in white schools 
in the state, the Iowa Supreme Court ruled against segregation 
in public schools in 1868, stating that for the state to permit seg-
regation “would be to sanction a plain violation of the spirit of 
our laws [and] tend to perpetuate the national differences of our 
people and stimulate a constant strife.” The ruling, which de-
clared that “all youths are equal before the law,” was remark-
able not just for its condemnation of school segregation nearly 
90 years before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954), but it also marked a departure from 
supreme court decisions in other states that upheld segregated 
schools elsewhere in the nation. Despite the court’s plain lan-
guage striking down de jure segregation in Iowa schools, resi-
dential segregation ensured that the tradition of sending children 
to schools in their neighborhoods would create and maintain 
school segregation.12  
 Efforts to end housing discrimination culminated in a minor 
victory in the late 1960s. In 1967 the state legislature passed a fair 
housing amendment to its civil rights bill, but an individual fil-
ing a claim had to submit a $500 bond—an amount roughly 
equivalent to $3,500 in 2013. That provision created a significant 
obstacle for complainants—and not just because it required the 
deposit of a large sum of money; anyone found to have filed a 
false complaint would lose the bond.13 The fair housing law 
demonstrated the difficulties that plaintiffs in discrimination 
cases faced, and it indicates why cases were rarely pursued. In 
                                                 
12. Clark v. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868); Roberts v. Boston 59 Mass (5 
Cush.) 198 (1850); Schwalm, Emancipation’s Diaspora, 198–200. The state legisla-
ture also enacted a public accommodations law in 1884 after the U.S. Supreme 
Court struck down the federal law in the Civil Rights Cases. McDaniel, “Trying 
Iowa’s Civil Rights Act in Davenport,” 235–38. 
13. Iowa’s state legislature voted to repeal the $500 bond provision in 1969. 
Congress passed a federal open housing law in April 1968, just one week after 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination, although the law did not apply to single-
family units until January 1, 1970—the type of housing most prevalent in small 
cities like Waterloo. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Fourth Annual Report: 1970 
(Des Moines, 1970), www.state.ia.us/government/crc/docs/annual70title 
.html; New York Times, 4/12/1968. For comparisons of dollar values, see 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Inflation Calculator, 
www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. 
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1968 only nine individuals filed complaints about housing dis-
crimination with the state’s Civil Rights Commission.14 With the 
alleged victims of discrimination shouldering the burden of proof, 
prosecuting such cases could be expensive and ineffective. By 
the time the young people at East High rebelled in 1968, the 
state had a century-long history of racial discrimination and 
segregation existing alongside some of the nation’s most liberal 
civil rights laws.  
 As was the case in cities across the nation, local residential 
segregation in Waterloo created racial segregation within the 
city’s schools. In 1963 Waterloo’s African American children 
attended 11 of its 40 public schools. Eighty-one percent of the 
city’s white children attended schools that were at least 90 per-
cent white, and many schools had no black students at all.15 
Even though African Americans made up a relatively small 
percentage of the city’s population, one elementary school had 
a student population that was 99 percent black, two had popu-
lations that were approximately 50 percent black, and another 
had a student population that was one-third black. In 1967, 
the year before the disturbances at East High erupted, African 
American students made up about one-fifth of that school’s 
population of 1,700. There were no black students at West High 
on the other side of town, the site of the football game.16  
 
YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICANS in Waterloo targeted the 
ways that racial discrimination in the public schools permeated 
the curricula and interpersonal relationships. In late August 1968, 
just weeks before the disturbances, Terri Pearson, an honors 
student at East High, and her younger sister Kathy handed a list 
of grievances to the school’s principal, Lawrence Garlock. The 
students’ decision to create and present a petition reflected a 
tradition established by other student protests of the 1960s, in-
cluding Students for a Democratic Society’s 1962 Port Huron 
                                                 
14. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, Third Annual Report: 1969 (Des Moines, 
1969), www.state.ia.us/government/crc/docs/annual69compliance.html. 
15. Minutes, Waterloo Commission on Human Rights, 9/7/1967, folder: Wa-
terloo Commission on Human Rights, 1967, box 22, Merle Fleming Papers, 
Iowa Women’s Archives, University of Iowa Libraries, Iowa City. 
16. USCCR, “School Desegregation in Waterloo,” 6.  
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Statement and the demands supplied by students advocating 
the establishment of ethnic studies departments on college 
campuses. The Pearson sisters’ list enumerated a number of 
complaints, including demands for a course in black history, 
integration of the entire social studies curriculum, and the 
hiring of more black teachers and counselors. Students also 
wanted permission to establish a black student union. These 
demands reflected a desire to change the everyday experiences 
of black students at East High and align them with what the 
students believed was a proper set of antidiscriminatory mores 
that should govern student and teacher behavior. 17  
 The petition was the first indication that the autumn would 
be long and difficult at East High, with black students committed 
to the cause of civil rights reform. Garlock acknowledged the 
complaints but refused to agree to any immediate changes. 
When he assured the young women that a faculty committee 
would look over the list, Terri Pearson informed him that other 
black students did not want to continue to wait for action. A 
delayed response, she said, might come “too late.” Concerned 
that Pearson’s words portended trouble, Garlock wrote her a 
letter a week later, warning that any disruptions might result 
in suspension or expulsion of the involved students. He again 
assured her that a special committee would review the griev-
ances “in a few weeks” and stated that any disruptive behavior 
“would be unfortunate as any grievances might be settled in a 
more reasonable fashion.”18  
 At noon on Monday, September 9, a handful of young black 
men entered East High School and demanded to meet with 
Garlock. At the same time, someone set off the fire alarm, evac-
                                                 
17. Minutes, Board of Directors of the Waterloo Community School District 
(hereafter cited as School Board Minutes), 9/12/1968, Waterloo Community 
School District Administration Building, Waterloo. For more on petitioning 
and college student protests, see Carlos Muñoz Jr., Youth, Identity, Power: The 
Chicano Movement (London, 1989); and Martha Biondi, The Black Revolution on 
Campus (Berkeley, CA, 2012). 
18. Iowa State Department of Public Instruction (DPI), “Report of Committee 
Named to Investigate the Background of Developments Culminating in the 
Closing of Waterloo’s East High School,” Feb. 1969, box 8, Waterloo Urban 
Ministry Records, Special Collections, Rod Library, University of Northern 
Iowa, Cedar Falls. 
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uating students and teachers from the building. After it was de-
clared a false alarm, the group of young men returned, accom-
panied by several black students from East High. They spoke to 
a teacher and, echoing the concerns presented by Terri Pearson 
a few weeks earlier, demanded that black history be integrated 
into East High’s social studies curriculum. A teacher tried to 
assuage them by promising that a community meeting to dis-
cuss the proposed black history course would be held the next 
day after school. At the meeting, students, parents, teachers, 
and administrators could air concerns about the school’s cur-
riculum and discuss possible solutions. The crowd dispersed 
for the afternoon, but the seriousness of black students’ con-
cerns was clear.19
 Publicly East High’s administrators denounced the confron-
tation at East High while they quietly began to take action to 
subvert further disturbances. The following morning, Tuesday, 
September 10, the superintendent and principal met with a 
group that included black parents and current and former stu-
dents to discuss potential curriculum changes. Despite the prin-
cipal and superintendent’s resistance to offering concessions 
to the students, the young men present were vocal about their 
desire to see East High treat black students more fairly. The 
school’s director of instruction was present, as were East High 
parent and NAACP member Ada Tredwell, former East High 
student Charles Derden, and several current students. Although 
the curriculum committee did have a revamped plan for the 
school’s social studies curriculum that integrated more African 
American history, Derden insisted that students would prefer 
an elective course focused solely on black history.20 The com-
mittee tentatively agreed to curriculum reform as a concession 
to the students. 
 The committee also decided to cancel the mass meeting 
scheduled for that afternoon, fearing that they would not be able 
to control the tone and tenor of the discussion. The students 
present at the meeting in the morning vehemently condemned 
the decision. “We’re not fooling around anymore,” warned one 
                                                 
19. Waterloo Courier, 9/10/1968. 
20. DPI, “Report of Committee,” 8. 
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Student protesters picket in front of Waterloo East High School in May 
1969. Photo courtesy Grout Museum District Archives. 
young man. “We’re going to get what we want. . . . We’re going 
to be at East High and there better be a meeting.” Another 
agreed, adding, “Don’t have any police over there. I know those 
kids. If there are police, there will be trouble.” The students 
were angered by the committee’s decision; they demanded to 
be taken seriously and have their grievances heard. In warning 
the committee that canceling the meeting could lead to trouble, 
these young people brandished the most powerful weapon they 
had: adults’ fears of youths’ indifference to authority—and their 
willingness to cause trouble if they considered it necessary.21
 The students’ warnings proved convincing. Despite the 
administrators’ attempts to avoid confrontation at the school, 
they could not simply dismiss a protest so large and deter-
mined. At 3:05 p.m., students were informed that school was 
dismissed and that all students except those on the football 
team should leave the building immediately. A crowd of nearly 
100 young men and women gathered outside; some were stu-
dents, and some were not. Garlock attempted to placate the pro-
testers by reminding them that East High’s curriculum techni-
                                                 
21. Ibid.; School Board Minutes, 9/12/1968. 
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cally did have a course on African American history—though 
the school had never hired anyone to teach it, ostensibly be-
cause they could not find anyone qualified to do so.22 The 
crowd eventually disbanded, but students did not waver from 
their promise to use disruption as a means to wrest power from 
the administration and school board.  
 The protests continued the next day. On Wednesday, 40 stu-
dents walked out of class in support of the proposed curricular 
changes. After dismissing school early, the Waterloo school 
board met in an emergency session to discuss the course of ac-
tion they would take to prevent the situation at East High from 
escalating. At the meeting, Jimmie Porter, the father of an East 
High School student, gave the school board another list of griev-
ances created by students. The board promised to consider the 
grievances and agreed to appoint an African American to its 
curriculum committee. The board also canceled classes on 
Thursday and Friday but decided not to reschedule the fateful 
football game between East High and St. Joseph’s.23
 The East High administration, the school board, and the lo-
cal newspaper all sought to delegitimize the actions of the pro-
testers by arguing that they were criminals and not members of 
the community. Scoffing at the idea that the protests were a le-
gitimate form of speech, Superintendent George Hohl attempted 
to discredit them by accusing “outsiders” of stirring up trouble. 
“This is a group of young adults not in a position to tell profes-
sionals who have worked on the problem for months whether it 
should be integrated or not, because, I submit, they know very 
little, if anything, about it,” Hohl told the Waterloo Courier. Hohl 
blamed student protests at colleges across the nation, claiming 
that the student movement and the New Left—not legitimate 
grievances by the students themselves—were responsible for 
the unrest in Waterloo. He did warn that, although East High 
students had been innocent bystanders, “with outsiders coming 
in, violence could erupt.”24 The local newspaper reported that 
the police department had identified the protesters as “militants 
                                                 
22. Waterloo Courier, 9/11/1968. 
23. School Board Minutes, 9/12/1968. 
24. Waterloo Courier, 9/10/1968. 
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and agitators,” and the paper listed the names and criminal rec-
ords of seven of the young male participants; all were between 
the ages of 17 and 21, and all resided in Waterloo, but none were 
currently students at East High.25
 The young people who protested at East High that week 
were not outsiders. They included current and former students 
whose complaints were rooted in their personal experiences of 
discrimination at East High. Their grievances indicated frustra-
tion with student-teacher interactions. The students demanded, 
for example, that “teachers and counselors shall not discourage 
students of any race from attending the college of their choice” 
and not “interfere with the personal lives of the students.” Stu-
dents complained that teachers would break up groups of black 
students standing in the halls but allow white students to con-
gregate freely. They also charged that teachers actively discour-
aged interracial dating, even calling parents of white students to 
inform them that their daughters were dating black students.26 
The students demanded that teachers “who do not feel they can 
treat or teach black students as equals to white students” resign 
or be fired.27
 In comments at the mass school board meeting on Friday af-
ternoon, Charles Derden was particularly vehement that teachers 
not discourage black students from applying to the schools of 
their choice. Derden, a pre-law student at the University of Iowa, 
had been East High’s valedictorian in 1965. He claimed that dis-
criminatory actions by white teachers and counselors had per-
sisted for years. During his senior year at East High, Derden re-
called, he had received letters from universities across the nation. 
“I was told to go to the State College of Iowa because I ‘could not 
compete’ in those schools.” “I went to the University of Iowa,” 
Derden stated, “because I didn’t believe everything that the white 
man told me about myself. But if I hadn’t believed any of it I 
would be in a better school today.” Derden’s commitment to pro-
test in Waterloo did emanate in part from his activism at the Uni-
versity of Iowa, where he was also involved in agitation to estab-
                                                 
25. Waterloo Courier, 9/12/1968. 
26. DPI, “Report of Committee,” 20. 
27. School Board Minutes, 9/13/1968. 
366      THE ANNALS OF IOWA 
lish a black studies department. But his complaints also arose 
from his own experience in the Waterloo schools. He returned to 
Waterloo to provide his organizing experience and participate 
in the protests at East High in solidarity with current students.28
 In an attempt to prevent the situation from escalating, the 
school board met again on Friday afternoon, just hours before 
the football game’s kickoff—and the disorder that would ensue. 
The board agreed to capitulate to some, but not all, of the stu-
dents’ demands. At the crowded meeting, which attracted 300 
community members, board president Sydney Thomas read 
aloud the 12 grievances and answered each one with a state-
ment from the school board. The board acknowledged the lack 
of black teachers in the school system and assured the audience 
that the schools would continue to work toward hiring African 
American teachers. The board also reaffirmed its commitment 
to offering a separate course in black history, although it claimed 
that it was delayed because of the school’s unsuccessful attempts 
to find and hire qualified African American teachers. It also as-
sented to the students’ request that they be called Afro-American 
or black—not Negro. The board refused to permit students to 
form a black student union, even though students promised 
that the organization would be open to both black and white 
students who wanted to join. Betty Jean Furgerson, an East High 
graduate and the leader of the Black Hawk County Head Start 
Program, stated, “The events leading up to this tragedy stem 
from the fact that the black students at East want a course in 
black history. They are asking for relevant education. The kids 
feel that they need it, and I’m proud they do. The whole thing 
grew up because nobody listened to what was being said.”29  
 Jimmie Porter, an East High parent, reiterated the students’ 
frustrations with the school board’s patronizing attitude. Porter 
demanded that the board take the students’ grievances seriously. 
“You’re not talking with kids,” Porter stated at the Friday after-
noon hearing. “You’re talking with a man. . . . We came here 
with good intentions to work these problems out and come to a 
quick solution,” Porter told the board. He added, “I don’t trust 
                                                 
28. DPI, “Report of Committee,” 19; Iowa City Press-Citizen, 11/21/1968. 
29. Waterloo Courier, 9/15/1968; DPI, “Report of Committee,” 17. 
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East High School parents Jimmie and “Lou” Porter were also owners of 
the first black-owned radio station in Iowa, KBBG. Photo courtesy Jimmie 
and “Lou” Porter. 
any of you and you don’t trust me.” Porter was a prominent fig-
ure in Waterloo’s black community. He had arrived in Waterloo 
in 1948 from Mississippi, hoping to find a job in the John Deere 
factory and an escape from Jim Crow. He was, as he put it, 
“looking for the promised land.” What he found disappointed 
him. Whites in Waterloo had, in his words, “domesticated” the 
black population. Segregation was not the law, as it was in the 
South, but whites in Waterloo had perfected informal methods 
of establishing white supremacy. Years later Porter observed, “I 
pretty well knew where I stood in Mississippi, and here I had to 
be told and reminded.”30
 The school board held another mass meeting on Monday, 
the first following the civil disorder at the football game. Once 
again, young people came to the meeting to articulate their 
demands. Terri Pearson again requested permission to form a 
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black student union, which she said would “promote better un-
derstanding between black and white students at East High 
and better understanding between the students and the faculty.” 
It would also serve to “encourage more participation from black 
students in the total activities of East High and to encourage 
black students to strive for higher scholastic achievement and 
prepare themselves to compete in our world today.” The board 
refused the request, claiming that the club was racially dis-
criminatory. When board members expressed exasperation 
with the frequency of meetings, Dwight Bachman, a senior at 
the nearby University of Northern Iowa, warned that things 
would only get worse if the administration did not act soon. 
“If you say this is not our matter we have plans for you that 
will not make you very comfortable,” warned Bachman. When 
pressed to explain what he meant by those “plans,” Bachman 
replied that he and others would show up at every school board 
meeting until they got what they wanted.31
 
THE CIVIL DISORDER that began at Friday’s football game 
was fed by the growing frustrations that young African Ameri-
can men and women in Waterloo felt in the face of discrimina-
tion and segregation within the community. Confrontations be-
tween young men and police officers were endemic to black life 
in Waterloo; members of the black community perpetually com-
plained of police brutality, and even the mayor admitted that 
police-community relations were toxic. The previous summer, 
the death of a young man, Eddie Wallace Sallis, in the city jail 
had aroused suspicion and concern that police brutality had 
been a factor. On May 31, 1966, Sallis and another young man, 
Howard Calvin Saunders, had been arrested in Waterloo on 
suspicion of being involved in a break-in. In the early morning 
hours of June 1, officers claimed that they had found Sallis 
hanged in his jail cell. “How could a man hang himself in jail if 
he is wearing only jeans?” asked Anna Mae Weems, an NAACP 
member and packinghouse worker at Rath. Sallis’s death was 
ruled a suicide, although many suspected foul play.32
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 The protests and civil disorder elicited a harsh reaction from 
the city’s police department, which promised to “deal head-on 
with the problem that faces our community with strict enforce-
ment and by taking strong action for which we have full sup-
port of our city administration.” Other residents were more 
sympathetic to the students’ complaints and acknowledged the 
existence of discrimination and inequality in the city.33  
 Although some were more supportive of the students than 
others, most residents recognized that the instances of civil dis-
order were symptoms of the persistence of racial discrimination 
and the culmination of years of discontent within the city’s 
black neighborhoods. Teachers at East High released a state-
ment that declared, “The East High School faculty feels that the 
present situation at East High is only a part of a national social 
condition. They also feel that the entire Waterloo community is 
responsible and must be involved.”34 The school board released 
its own statement on the disturbances at East High that chastised 
students who had contributed to the disruption while calling 
for community self-examination. Denouncing the “tragic law-
lessness” of the instances of civil disorder, the statement never-
theless declared, 
The events of Friday night seem to indicate that the underlying 
problem in Waterloo is more than a problem of educational policy, 
and is one which will require the efforts of the total community 
to resolve. . . . From this point, it is the responsibility of all of the 
citizens of the City of Waterloo and of the Waterloo Community 
School District to restore an atmosphere of calm and reason.35
The faculty and school board’s statements underscored the agree-
ment that although they did not necessarily condone the method 
of students’ protests, their complaints were not necessarily ille-
gitimate. Others outside the schools agreed. Twenty-two Meth-
odist ministers from Waterloo signed a statement that blamed 
the violence on “sicknesses long neglected” and proclaimed 
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that “massive healing must take place to prevent recurrences of 
the same.”36  
 In the following months, conversation in the city continued 
to use the civil disorder as a touchstone for a plan for commu-
nity action, although the focus of those efforts shifted in crucial 
ways. Whereas the students’ grievances emphasized the need to 
empower African American students and break down barriers 
to equal opportunity, the solutions sought by the school board 
turned to desegregation, placing segregation rather than inequity 
at the center of the debate. Although students had provided the 
impetus for reform, the board opted for school desegregation, 
even though it had never been a part of students’ demands. 
 The students succeeded on a number of issues, particularly 
on the inclusion of black history in East High’s curriculum and 
the hiring of two black teachers by mid-October. In late Novem-
ber, the school board unanimously approved a resolution to cre-
ate a citizens advisory committee made up of a “representative” 
group—in other words, a coalition that included whites and 
African Americans—who would “study the problems . . . in 
connection with providing all children in the school district 
with maximum educational opportunities, particularly the 
problems resulting from a concentration of black children and 
culturally deprived children in certain schools.”37 Problems 
within the Waterloo schools arose primarily from segregation 
and minority concentration, according to the board, an assertion 
that shifted concern to the makeup of the student body, not the 
quality of teacher-student relations or the schools’ curricula. 
 
THE DISTURBANCES at East High and in Waterloo’s black 
neighborhoods set in motion a series of actions by local and 
state authorities that would profoundly shape school policy—
although not necessarily as the students had intended. In the 
week following the incidents, the county attorney announced 
that he would convene a grand jury to investigate the violence 
and arson. The grand jury’s task was to issue indictments for 
any crimes committed during the disturbances. It did not, how-
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ever, indict any person for any crime. In an unusual move, the 
grand jury unofficially indicted the community as a whole for 
its role in creating an atmosphere that led to civil disorder. Ac-
cording to the grand jury, “It is the present finding of the grand 
jury that our schools be geared toward the present society. . . . It 
is the obligation of the public school system to take a giant step 
in that direction by eliminating de facto segregation at once.” 
The report concluded, “The grand jury recommends immediate 
integration at the elementary level.” A year later, the grand jury 
released another report, documenting the changes that had been 
implemented in the community and recommending desegrega-
tion at all levels.38  
 Mayor Lloyd Turner denounced the grand jury’s report. It 
placed all of the blame for the disturbances, he complained, on 
“the shoulders of whites.” Turner accused the grand jury of not 
giving enough credit to the city’s and state’s civil rights reforms, 
and he pointed to the new fair housing law as evidence of prog-
ress in race relations. He failed to mention the housing law’s 
prohibitive bond provision.39
 Discussions of the potentially negative effect of segregated 
schooling on children were not new to the board or the city, but 
the civil disturbances made the issue seem more urgent. The 
year before, the school board had identified racial segregation 
as a problem in its schools but refused to accept any blame for 
its existence and refrained from proposing any mandatory solu-
tions. The 1967 report of its newly formed Advisory Committee 
on Equal Education Opportunity emphasized the need to reduce 
the segregation of African American students in a few schools, 
although the committee restated the board’s “conviction that it 
has not at any time allowed practices which would artificially 
establish or maintain segregation or discrimination, whether eth-
nic, religious, or racial.”40 It was no secret that African American 
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children attended just a few of the city’s schools, but the school 
board would not admit that it was the fault of the state or the 
school district. 
 Despite its previous unwillingness to admit fault in the seg-
regation of Waterloo’s schools, the school board did vote in the 
spring of 1969 to enact a policy of open enrollment for the fol-
lowing school year. That policy allowed a student to transfer to 
any school of his or her choice as long as the transfer promoted 
a “favorable” racial balance.41 Dissatisfied with the board’s tepid 
policy, parents presented 200 letters in support of “the principle 
of total integration,” demanding decisive action in May 1969.42 
While the school board voted to commit itself to “the elimina-
tion of the heavy concentrations of minority group and disad-
vantaged” students in Waterloo schools and to “develop plans 
to achieve this end” in the fall, it remained committed to the 
idea that the schools would be desegregated voluntarily through 
open enrollment. The chair of the school board emphasized that 
he believed that only a voluntary plan would gain full com-
munity acceptance. Dr. Robert Harvey, the board’s sole African 
American member, disagreed that full support was desirable. 
“If the policy is to work, some people will have to be bused who 
don’t want to be bused,” Harvey concluded. White parents 
would be reluctant to send their children to schools on the city’s 
east side, so the burden of desegregation would remain on 
black children and parents. The rest of the board disagreed with 
Harvey, the only member in favor of a mandatory busing plan.43
 The board continued to push a voluntary policy by reor-
ganizing the city’s most segregated school. Grant Elementary 
School, a school with a student population that was 99 percent 
black in 1967, would be reconfigured as an integration academy 
in the fall of 1970. It would become a magnet school that would 
house the Bridgeway Project—a school modeled on the Martin 
Luther King Jr. Laboratory School in Evanston, Illinois, which 
attracted white students to a previously mostly black school by 
providing the kind of cutting-edge pedagogical innovations 
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Students in an integrated classroom at Waterloo’s Grant Elementary School 
pose for a class picture. Photo courtesy Reasby family. 
found in laboratory schools.44 The central idea behind the crea-
tion of such schools was that districts could persuade—rather 
than force—white parents to send their children to desegregated 
schools. It was an effective idea. When Grant School opened in 
the fall of 1970, it had a nearly perfect fifty-fifty balance of Afri-
can American and white children. The Bridgeway Project was 
able to draw white students to a school that in previous years 
had had almost none, although it also displaced half of the black 
children previously enrolled at Grant who had to transfer to 
other schools. With few other white students choosing to trans-
fer to schools with high concentrations of black students, the 
burden of desegregation was placed on the shoulders of African 
American children, just as Harvey had predicted.45
 By 1970, voluntary school desegregation had failed, except 
at Grant School, to create meaningful change. Only 30 African 
American students attended West High, and none attended 
Orange High. Almost all of the district’s African American high 
school students remained at East.46 Efforts were more successful 
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at the elementary level, with African American students enrolling 
at all but 8 of the city’s 30 schools. In theory, this was a victory 
for voluntary desegregation. A comprehensive look at the city’s 
schools told another story—one that the school board did not 
want to see. Between 1967 and 1970, although black students 
were no longer isolated in a small fraction of the city’s schools, 
the percentage of students at schools that already had high con-
centrations of black students did not decrease; in many cases it 
actually increased. Such was the case at City View Elementary, 
which went from 86 to 90 percent black over the span of three 
years. The percentage of black students at Frances Grout School 
increased from 23.5 percent to 32.2 percent; Hawthorne Elemen-
tary’s black population also increased by nearly 10 percent to 
52 percent. The percentage of black students at Longfellow and 
Roosevelt Elementary increased incrementally; both continued 
to have disproportionate percentages of black students. The 
percentages at Logan Junior High and East High School also 
increased, from 30 to 35 and 21 to 23 percent, respectively.47 
In other words, as voluntary desegregation programs were 
implemented, not only were schools that had previously been 
all white increasing their percentages of black students, but so 
were schools that were already highly segregated. As the pro-
portion of African American students in the district steadily in-
creased between 1967 and 1970, both segregation and desegre-
gation increased.  
 Desegregation was once again pushed onto the school 
board’s agenda in late 1971. A new series of civil disturbances 
in the spring meant that the board could no longer simply rely 
on token desegregation. In November 1971 the state Department 
of Public Instruction (DPI) released a report on segregation in 
Waterloo schools that recommended immediate desegregation. 
The report, the culmination of a half-year investigation by the 
DPI, reignited the debate over desegregation and inflamed criti-
cism of the school board’s lackadaisical policy. The NAACP 
threw its support behind immediate implementation of the state 
proposal. “There has been too long a delay, and it is the respon-
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sibility of the members of the Board of Education to act,” Robert 
Wright Sr., regional director of the NAACP, told the board. “Fail-
ure to act would be indefensible.” Yet the board, on a 4 to 2 vote 
in December, defeated a motion for immediate desegregation.48
 The state’s report also sparked organizing by parents who 
opposed mandatory busing but who had previously been silent 
on the issue of voluntary desegregation. Within a week of the 
issuance of the report, more than two thousand parents attended 
a meeting of the newly formed Neighborhood Schools Associa-
tion (NSA). “I’d like to say thank you to the state Department 
of Public Instruction and the school board for their help in the 
membership drive,” the organization’s president joked at the 
meeting.49 The NSA styled itself as “a new organization whose 
sole purpose is to strive to preserve the traditional neighbor-
hood school concept.” Fearing that the school board would im-
pose mandatory busing to achieve meaningful desegregation, 
the organization sought to discourage sitting school board 
members from voting for desegregation. At the same time, the 
NSA campaigned for candidates who claimed to oppose any 
form of busing.50 NSA members devoted themselves to attend-
ing school board meetings en masse to prove their anti-busing 
mettle to the school board. 
 While some white parents were organizing on the side of 
neighborhood schools, the local teachers’ union, the Waterloo 
Education Association (WEA), made an open-ended commit-
ment to the principle of total integration. Although it did not go 
so far as to endorse a busing plan, the WEA stated that teachers 
did “recognize the need for and the advantages of a completely 
integrated public school, and thereby committed themselves to 
helping formulate any program that would bring this about.” 
The WEA argued that socialization across the color line was es-
sential for the positive development of all children in the city 
and was necessary for full participation in American life. The 
WEA’s newly established Human Relations Commission stated, 
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“The purpose of the Human Relations program for the Water-
loo Education Association is to try to achieve now what the 
original ‘melting pot’ was supposed to do when this country 
was settled. To do this it will be necessary for people to get to 
know and become more involved with each other.”51 The WEA 
echoed the sentiment of others that school segregation was bad 
not just for African Americans but for everyone. In the organi-
zation’s statement, the color line was the primary problem and 
desegregation of schools its most effective solution. 
 At the next meeting of the school board in January, Dr. Har-
vey once again pushed the board to take a firm stand on deseg-
regation. He presented ten recommendations to accomplish 
“total integration” and end the voluntary desegregation system, 
including hiring more black teachers, principals, and adminis-
trative personnel and implementing more forceful measures to 
eradicate racism in the schools. Harvey also recommended the 
purchase of new materials for classrooms and libraries that in-
tegrated African American history. The League of Women Vot-
ers issued a statement in support of total integration, stating, 
“We do believe that the adoption of a workable plan is urgently 
needed for the goal of quality and equal education for Waterloo 
children—both black and white.” Despite the support of a grow-
ing coalition—the WEA, the League of Women Voters, and the 
NAACP—the board voted down the measure.52
 In the following weeks more organizations joined the WEA, 
the NAACP, and the League of Women Voters in support of 
Harvey’s proposal for mandatory desegregation. The Waterloo 
Women’s Civic Club denounced the board’s vote on the issue. 
The organization’s president accused the board of giving false 
reasons for delaying action. “We are forced to believe that sincere 
honesty is not being demonstrated in this matter of school in-
tegration,” she wrote in a letter to the president of the school 
board. Parents of the children enrolled in the Bridgeway Project 
at Grant School submitted a letter that was also read at the meet-
ing, stating their support for further desegregation in the city. 
“We . . . have experienced the value of quality education in an 
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integrated setting,” the statement read. “Because of this ex-
perience we strongly urge the Board of Education to rapidly 
expand this kind of educational opportunity throughout the 
entire system.”53  
 Chastened by the overwhelming community response but 
still reluctant to act, the board approved a measure to “give 
careful thought and study to the ten proposals of Dr. Harvey” 
and discuss them again at the next meeting. The board agreed 
to redraw the high school boundaries, a move that would trans-
fer some black students from East High to the newly built Cen-
tral High School and slightly increase the number of African 
American students at West High.54  
 The board’s actions failed to address any other facets of ra-
cial discrimination in the schools, and so ignited more commu-
nity controversy just a few months later in the spring of 1972. In 
late May, Alice Hayes, a speech teacher at West Junior High 
School—a school that had had no black students before the start 
of open enrollment—read her class a story, “Little Brown Koko 
and the Preacher’s Watermelon,” as a part of her class’s unit on 
“dialect.” The story described Koko’s “little wooly head” and 
his “nice, good, old, fat, black Mammy”—tropes that relied on 
nostalgic depictions of slavery. An African American student 
in the class, upset by the racist portrayal of blacks in the story, 
complained to the vice principal, who failed to address the issue 
with Hayes. A group of concerned parents then met with the 
district’s school and community relations coordinator, but that 
meeting, too, failed to result in any substantial action.55  
 The incident threatened to send the city into disorder, as 
had student protests at East High four years prior. The follow-
ing week, approximately 30 parents walked into Alice Hayes’s 
classroom and refused to leave until she was fired. “Any teacher 
that can teach this kind of thing shouldn’t be allowed to teach 
in this system or even state,” one appalled parent stated. The 
school’s principal, Joseph Doyle, sent Hayes home for the day, 
but the parents refused to leave unless she was dismissed from 
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her position. When Doyle balked at their request, they insisted 
that he also be fired, accusing him of implicitly condoning 
Hayes’s actions. Two days later, 150 black parents and children 
entered the Waterloo School District Administration Building, 
demanding an audience with the superintendent. The group 
entered Superintendent George Diestelmeier’s office and pre-
sented him with a list of demands. When Diestelmeier attempted 
to leave, it became clear that he would have to walk on or over 
parents and small children in order to get out. The parents and 
children held the superintendent in his office for five hours be-
fore an injunction forced them to leave.56  
 While Diestelmeier sat with the parents, the school board 
met in an emergency meeting at an elementary school. The 
board voted to support the administration’s current policies; 
Harvey, still the lone African American member of the board, 
voiced his displeasure by abstaining from the votes. The next 
day the school board met again, this time voting to reinstate 
Hayes. Not every board member approved of the decision. 
Reverend Gamb, the only other board member besides Harvey 
who favored forced desegregation, accused the other members 
of being “hell bent on inflaming the situation.”57  
 While African American parents kept their children home 
from school to protest the school board’s failure to act, approx-
imately 100 white students staged a walkout in support of Hayes. 
The controversy over Alice Hayes became increasingly heated 
in the following week as protests spread out into the community 
and elicited a violent response. Frustrated by the board’s actions, 
the protesters who had been ejected from the superintendent’s 
office regrouped and began boycotting the city’s shopping center, 
Logan Center Plaza. They announced that they would picket the 
plaza until the school board acquiesced to their demands, hoping 
that the boycott would pressure the business community into 
influencing the board’s decisions. Boycotters and white shop-
pers accused each other of assault. One white man was arrested 
for attacking picketers with a wrench, and a white woman called 
the police after she claimed that protesters knocked her to the 
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ground. Concerned that the situation might escalate into wide-
scale civil disorder, the city set up a “rumor control” phone line, 
and the U.S. Department of Justice sent a field representative to 
Waterloo to help the city control the crisis.58
 During the summer of 1972, the school board and various 
pro- and anti-desegregation forces in the community were at an 
impasse. In July the NAACP filed a lawsuit accusing the school 
district of deliberately segregating the schools, but still the board 
did not budge.59 What ultimately ended the standoff was some-
thing that few anticipated: demographic change.  
 
WITH FEWER CHILDREN in Waterloo schools, the school 
board faced the need to close schools. Enrollment statistics for the 
1972–73 school year showed a significant decrease in the number 
of children enrolled in Waterloo public schools.60 Fewer students 
meant that the district would receive less funding from the state. 
The superintendent and school board realized that the district 
would not be able to pay its bills in the upcoming year. Projec-
tions for the next five years anticipated a loss of 3,000 public 
school students in the district due to demographic change.61  
 Federal funds for desegregation through the Emergency 
School Aid Act of 1972 provided a way for the district to ease 
the process of school reorganization with minimal financial 
commitment from the district. Persuaded by the numbers, in 
February 1973 board president James Sage wrote an open letter 
to the other members of the board calling for complete desegre-
gation. “We cannot continue to rear our children in a commu-
nity which has so much distrust and fear between the races,” 
Sage wrote. “If we want new industries and business to come 
and provide jobs for our children in the future, we are going to 
have to realize that the community must attempt to solve the 
racial feelings that have developed, otherwise the community 
will ‘wither away.’”62 The Neighborhood Schools Association 
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shared Sage’s ideas in principle, agreeing that distrust and fear 
must be the target of community action. The point of disagree-
ment, NSA head Harold Getty noted, was the place where this 
battle must be fought. “We do not agree with his suggestion 
that the school district is the only institution that should at-
tempt the task of social change since no one else does,” Getty 
wrote in response to Sage’s open letter.63 The district’s financial 
situation may have changed the minds of board members, but 
the NSA remained firmly opposed to mandatory desegregation. 
 Larger demographic shifts were primarily behind the de-
clining enrollment in Waterloo’s public schools. In Waterloo 
the total public school population was decreasing while the 
percentage that was African American was increasing steadily. 
The Waterloo Community School District lost more than 1,200 
white students in just four years—7.5 percent of its entire white 
student population. The increase in the number of African 
American students was less dramatic than the declining number 
of white students, as there were about 85 more black students 
in the system in 1973 than in 1969.64 The loss of white students 
was due at least in part to the aging of the white population. 
Between 1956 and 1966, Iowans’ birth rate fell by nearly a third.65 
The shrinking enrollment of white students in Waterloo’s pub-
lic schools was not due to large-scale white flight from the city 
or the schools, as Waterloo’s population was actually growing 
during these years, not declining. Nor can general city popula-
tion increases be wholly attributed to the in-migration of Afri-
can Americans.66 And there is no evidence that the decline was 
caused by large-scale enrollments in parochial schools, as the 
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decline in white student enrollments began before the student 
unrest in 1968.67 At the precise moment that the Waterloo school 
district sought to implement integration, it was undergoing a 
dramatic shift in the population of those very schools. 
 These trends were evident not only at the local level; they 
were indicative of a larger trend in Iowa that created an age gulf 
between the white and black populations. Statewide, in 1970 the 
median age of African Americans was 21.1, whereas the median 
age of whites was 29.0. The median age of black men was even 
lower, 20.3, versus 27.6 for white men.68 In Waterloo, this shift-
ing population could be seen in the ages of schoolchildren. The 
school population peaked in 1967, with roughly 19,700 children 
enrolled in Waterloo public schools. The projected school en-
rollment for 1976 was just 16,272, and almost all of the loss was 
in lower grades. While the number of high school students in 
Waterloo remained fairly constant, fluctuating by only a few 
dozen throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the number of 
elementary school children dropped dramatically, from a high 
of 11,388 in 1967 to only 9,682 in 1973.69 An increase in parochial 
school enrollment during the early 1970s also contributed to the 
phenomenon, although not by enough to account entirely for 
declining enrollment in Waterloo public schools.70 Given these 
trends, compounded by the influx of new African American 
children, it is not surprising that segregation was rapidly in-
creasing in Waterloo schools during this period. It is also likely 
that the prominence of school issues in community debates dur-
ing this period had much to do with this dramatic change. The 
white population of Waterloo was increasingly older, while its 
young population was increasingly African American.  
 Faced with declining enrollment, increasing segregation, and 
recurrent protests within Waterloo’s public schools, the school 
board began considering potential plans that would close schools, 
create a more efficient use of classroom space, and alleviate the 
increasing segregation of black children in city schools. The 
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plans were introduced at a board meeting on March 12, 1973. 
All of the plans involved boundary changes, but the most popu-
lar was Plan A, which proposed pairing and combining schools 
with high and very low percentages of African American stu-
dents and closing three of the city’s oldest elementary schools. 
Plan A aligned elementary and junior high school attendance 
zones with those of the new high school zones so that groups of 
students would move together through the new system and not 
be scattered as they transitioned from elementary to junior high 
schools, and then from junior high to high schools. It also mini-
mized the need for busing, as a third of the students who would 
be reassigned remained within walking distance of their new 
schools. The plan required the addition of only five buses to the 
district’s existing fleet of sixty.71  
 The board planned a vote on the proposed plans on April 5, 
1973. Because of the large turnout, the school board meeting 
was held at West High School—the same place, nearly five 
years earlier, where unrest had broken out at the football game 
with East High and forced city residents to acknowledge and 
address problems of the city’s youth: racial discrimination and 
segregation in schools. Six hundred people showed up at the 
school board meeting, many bearing signs voicing opposition to 
desegregation.  
 Consensus from community groups who supported deseg-
regation coalesced in support for Plan A. A local doctor read 
a statement in support of Plan A, which stressed that schools 
should be the crucible of American democracy. “The concept of 
an open society is a cornerstone of our national conscience. . . . 
Forced isolation breeds fear and is a burden and threat to all of us. 
It is with this goal of an open and just society that we urge you 
to adopt Plan A. It is a small but positive step toward helping 
this community regain its health and self respect.”72 The local 
branch of the American Association of University Women like-
wise applauded Plan A’s attack on a “closed society.” Accord-
ing to AAUW President Cecile Powers, the organization sup-
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ported “educational programs essential to a democratic society” 
through “programs directed toward improved intergroup and 
interpersonal relations necessary in an ethnically pluralistic so-
ciety.” The League of Women Voters, the Waterloo Education 
Association, and the Title VII Advisory Committee all joined in 
support of Plan A.73
 The Neighborhood Schools Association disapproved of all 
the reorganization plans, although the organization offered no 
alternative solutions to the funding crisis. It was joined by the 
tepid opposition of the Waterloo Council of PTAs, which ex-
pressed concern about the school board’s apparent neglect of 
parents’ “negative feelings toward forced busing of their chil-
dren.” The NSA and the PTA council suggested that the board 
continue to discuss the issue and create more advisory councils. 
Their position was bolstered by the support of more than 500 
citizens who opposed all of the plans, as they all required the 
closing of Lafayette School. Even though desegregation would 
only incrementally increase the number of children being bused 
within the Waterloo school district, Lafayette School parents 
believed that “it would be mass murder to expect our children 
to cross a four lane highway . . . to attend a school.” One white 
mother, who had five children in city schools, accused the school 
board of attempting to “sell the children of the Waterloo School 
District into the slavery of statistics for Federal Aid.” Growing 
support for desegregation and school reorganization led the op-
position to resort to increasingly inflammatory comments about 
the fate of white children in a desegregated school system.74  
 Despite the mother’s admonition not to “hang another mill-
stone around the necks of our children,” the protestations of 
the opposition groups went unheeded. On April 5, 1973, the 
board voted 4 to 3 to approve Plan A. Even in the face of grass-
roots mass resistance by white parents, the school board refused 
to discard desegregation as a necessary complement to school 
reorganization. After the vote was taken, half the parents in at-
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tendance got up and walked out in protest, chanting “Freedom! 
Freedom!” and “Let’s have another Pontiac!” (referring to the 
efforts of white parents in Pontiac, Michigan, to oppose deseg-
regation efforts there in a movement that made national head-
lines when Klansmen bombed 13 school buses that were to be 
used in the city’s new desegregation plan).75  
 The approval of Plan A marked a watershed moment. It in-
dicated that the school board had finally committed to substan-
tive reform. Those who opposed desegregation wrote vitriol-
filled letters to Sage and the superintendent, threatening their 
lives and, in one case, labeling them “yellow-bellied bastards.”76 
Despite the continued protests against busing, once the plan was 
approved, the school board remained committed to its desegre-
gation plan. Although Sage lost his seat in the fall’s school board 
election, the new NSA-endorsed members did not block the 
implementation of Plan A.77 After years of struggle, racial re-
form in the schools was finally codified in school board policy. 
 
THE SUCCESS of the desegregation plan masked what had 
been lost in the course of turning protest into policy. Although 
students had initiated school reform, the results looked little 
like what they had imagined in 1968. Young people got the at-
tention that they demanded, but that only partially achieved 
their goals. Their radical ideas could have dramatically re-
shaped schools for all students in the city, making education 
more democratic and equitable across lines of race and class. 
The struggle over the schools threatened traditional sources of 
authority, including the school board and East High’s admini-
stration, and brought children into the decision-making process 
for the first time. The civil disorder of the autumn of 1968 effec-
tively turned attention toward the young people’s complaints, 
but it also turned the debates away from the specific demands 
of the students and toward a more community consensus–
oriented solution: desegregation.  
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 School desegregation became a panacea designed to cure 
the ills of racial discrimination in Waterloo schools. It was a 
public policy that could signal the city’s commitment to an in-
tegrated “open” society, but it failed to address many of the 
ways that racial discrimination continued to affect life for Afri-
can American children in the city. The democratic process of 
implementing desegregation made the issue itself one that was 
inflected with the basic idea of community. That process be-
came a proxy for debates about life in a democratic society. 
Civil disorder led to the creation of a plan for school desegrega-
tion, which in turn ignored many of the students’ basic requests 
and flattened ideas about race, rights, and civic belonging. The 
local nature of the implementation of civil rights reform allowed 
individuals more power in the formation of policies, but it also 
brought more competing voices into the debate. As residents of 
Waterloo debated the benefits and drawbacks of desegregating 
their schools, the discussion shifted from one that centered on 
restorative justice for black children to one that emphasized the 
benefits of desegregation for all children and the city itself. 
The photograph on page 363 should have been credited to 
photographer David Weldon. We regret the omission.
